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T
he payday loan, or more generally, the deferred deposit loan, is 
among the most contentious forms of credit. It typically signi-
fies a small-dollar, short-term, unsecured loan to a high-risk 
borrower, often resulting in an effective annual percentage rate of 390 
percent—a rate well in excess of usury limits set by many states.
Consumer advocates argue that payday loans take advantage of vul-
nerable, uninformed borrowers and often create “debt spirals.” Debt 
spirals arise from repeated payday borrowing, using new loans to pay 
off old ones, and often paying many times the original loan amount in 
interest. In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, many policymakers are 
considering strengthening consumer protections on payday lending. 
A substantial volume of literature has examined the dangers of pay-
day lending, yet few studies have focused on any unintended conse-
quences of restricting such lending. Thus, the question arises: Could 
restrictions on payday lending have adverse effects?
This article examines payday lending and provides new empirical 
evidence on how restrictions could affect consumers. The first section 
discusses why many states restrict the practice of payday lending and 
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describes the pattern of restrictions. The second section explores ways 
in which restrictions might adversely affect consumers. The third sec-
tion reviews the limited existing evidence on such effects and provides 
new evidence. 
The analysis shows that restrictions could deny some consumers 
access to credit, limit their ability to maintain formal credit standing, 
or force them to seek more costly credit alternatives. Thus, any policy 
decisions to restrict payday lending should weigh these potential costs 
against the potential benefits.
I.  MOTIVATION FOR PAYDAY LENDING REGULATION
Payday lending came under fire almost as soon as it surfaced, and 
consumer advocates have kept pressure on lenders and policymakers 
ever since. Chief among the concerns are the high cost of payday loans, 
the tendency for payday loans to contribute to consumer debt spirals, 
and the targeting of payday lending to financially vulnerable popula-
tions. These concerns often justify calls for additional regulation of 
payday lending.
The costs of payday borrowing
Consumer advocates feel that payday loans are a menace to con-
sumers for a number of reasons, but chief among these is their high 
cost. Most states have established legal limits on the rate of interest that 
can be charged on a loan, usually 6 to 12 percent (Glaeser and Scheink-
man). In many cases, however, lenders are not subject to these laws. 
For example, the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary 
Control Act of 1980 eliminated usury limits for most loans made by 
banks. Some payday lenders have partnered with banks to take advan-
tage of looser usury laws (Chin). Other lenders or types of loans are 
subject to their own specific laws. 
While payday lenders often charge fees rather than interest   
payments, in effect these charges are interest. Comparing the terms 
of varying types of loans requires computing an effective, or implied, 
annual interest rate. For payday loans, this computation is straightfor-
ward. A typical payday loan charges $15 per $100 borrowed. If the 
term of the loan is two weeks, then the effective annual interest rate 
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rate (APR) on credit cards, the traditional source for rapid short-term 
loans, was 14.7 percent (Simon). Thus, the fee on a typical payday loan 
is more than 25 times greater than the interest on a typical credit card.
Of course, a payday loan provides cash. Most credit card fees on 
cash advances, if considered short-term loans, are costly as well. The fee 
for cash advances on many credit cards has recently climbed to 4 or 5 
percent (Blumenthal). In addition, higher interest rates, which average 
25 percent, generally apply to cash advances (Blumenthal). Thus, on 
a two-week loan, the effective annual interest rate would average from 
129 to 155 percent. In addition, cash advances are typically not subject 
to the interest grace period associated with purchases.
Presumably, a potential payday loan borrower would use a credit 
card if available. A 2009 study found that most payday borrowers with 
credit cards have “substantial credit card liquidity.”  Yet borrowers often 
choose not to use their credit card (Agarwal and others). Such financial 
behavior could result from a lack of information, at least for some bor-
rowers. While the typical APR on a payday loan is 390 percent, about 
one-third of the respondents to a 2007 survey of payday loan customers 
reported an implausibly low APR on their most recent payday loan of 
less than 30 percent, and half reported an APR of less than 200 percent 
(Elliehausen). About 95 percent of the respondents gave an accurate 
report of the finance fee in dollar terms. Thus, many borrowers appear 
to have a problem translating the fee into an APR.1 
Other, more informed, consumers may choose a payday loan over 
available traditional credit for sensible reasons. Such behavior is similar 
to that of consumers who use credit cards to make purchases when they 
have available low-earning liquid assets. For example, many households 
hold cash in savings or money market accounts that currently earn less 
than 1 percent. Yet they often choose to roll over large amounts of cred-
it card debt from month to month, paying an average interest rate of 
about 15 percent. The pecuniary losses associated with this pattern of 
behavior can be quite large. Some researchers argue that households rec-
ognize a need to have money readily available when using a credit card 
is not an option—for example, when making rent payments (Telyukova 
and Wright). Similar logic may explain why some borrowers resort to 
payday loans even if they have credit cards. 66  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
Another potential explanation for this credit puzzle is that payday 
lenders are misleading consumers. There is limited evidence for this ex-
planation. The Center for Responsible Lending suggested in 2001 that 
much of the misinformation about payday loan interest rates can be 
attributed to intentional misrepresentation on the part of lenders. The 
report quotes a payday lender’s business plan:2 
Remember, in your response to clients’ questions  
regarding your fees, [say] “We charge $15 per $100  
advanced.” Sounds like 15%, but in reality since it is 
an 8 day loan, the true annual percentage rate is 805%!
Further, an evaluation of payday lending in Colorado revealed that most 
promotional finance fees from payday lenders are provided for the first 
loan only, at least in that state (Chessin). Given that payday customers 
often have trouble repaying loans without additional borrowing, typically 
from the same lender, promoting fees in this way could lead borrowers 
into a series of renewals that rapidly increase the cost of the loan.
A reasonable argument could be made that payday lenders take 
advantage of customers who have few other options—and perhaps no 
options with favorable terms. Evaluating this argument rests largely on 
examining the profitability of payday lenders. If payday lenders’ costs 
justify their high prices, then the argument may not be sound. 
Payday lenders typically offer two justifications for their high fees 
(Huckstep). First, their operating costs are especially high. For example, 
because an important attribute of payday lending for customers is conve-
nience, payday lenders must maintain a high density of stores and remain 
open beyond normal business hours. Second, the incidence of default on 
payday loans is high. A 2005 FDIC study reported that the mean ratio of 
loan losses to total revenue for the two large payday lenders studied was 
15.1 percent (Flannery and Samolyk). Overall, this study and Huckstep’s 
research suggest that large fees on payday loans may be warranted. Fur-
ther, evidence has shown that firm-level returns of payday lenders differ 
little from typical financial firms (Skiba and Tobacman 2007a). Thus, 
while some payday lenders may take advantage of borrowers in some 
ways, payday lenders in general are not gouging borrowers.3 ECONOMIC REVIEW • FIRST QUARTER 2011  67
Debt spirals
While profitability may not be excessive among payday lenders 
generally, data suggest that the bulk of lenders’ profits come from re-
peat borrowers (Chin). The payday business model may therefore rest 
on activities that may not be in the best interest of most consumers.
According to a recent report by the Center for Responsible Lend-
ing, only 2 percent of payday loans are extended to nonrepeat bor-
rowers (Parrish and King). More than three-quarters of payday loans 
are made to borrowers who have paid off another payday loan within 
the previous two weeks. The remainder consists of initial loans to re-
peat borrowers and repeat loans that occur more than two weeks after 
the previous loan. Another study of 145,000 payday loan applications 
found that, on average, those approved for a payday loan subsequently 
applied for 8.8 additional payday loans (Skiba and Tobacman 2007b). 
Most states have limits on loan rollovers, which involve extending the 
due date of the loan in exchange for an additional fee. But payday 
borrowers (in consort with lenders) may circumvent these restrictions 
by repaying the loan in full and then opening a new loan in its place. 
A few states place restrictions on such renewals. The problem with 
multiple renewals is that borrowers can find themselves in an unman-
ageable cycle of debt. 
Debt spirals can cause serious problems for consumers. A recent 
study found that loan approval for first-time payday loan applicants, 
despite the small $300 average size of a first-time loan, increases Chap-
ter 13 bankruptcy filing rates by roughly 2.5 percentage points over 
two years (Skiba and Tobacman 2009). The study suggested that two 
factors drive the effect. Borrowers typically are already stressed when 
they begin paying on their payday loans. And payday loan applicants 
typically borrow repeatedly.
Targeting of at-risk populations
Another common complaint is that payday lenders target finan-
cially vulnerable populations, particularly low-income people and   
minorities.4 One study found that payday lenders specifically target 
neighborhoods with higher shares of poor and minority residents. 
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minority areas is that minorities are more likely to have low incomes. 
However, another study found that payday lenders disproportionately 
locate in African-American and Latino neighborhoods even after in-
come and other factors are considered in the analysis (Li and others). 
A report by the Consumer Federation of America and the U.S. Public 
Interest Research Group quoted a payday lender business plan that sug-
gests that “welfare-to-work women” provide a “fertile market.”    
Although a payday loan customer is typically financially vulnerable, 
payday lenders are not necessarily targeting their customers inappropri-
ately. Identifying the motivations of lenders and customers is difficult. 
Payday lenders may create demand for their product by targeting finan-
cially vulnerable populations, or they may simply be locating their stores 
where markets exist. 
Overview of state payday lending regulations
Concerns over high costs, unmanageable debt spirals, and the 
targeting of financially vulnerable populations have led some states 
to regulate payday lending. Most of the regulations have focused on 
restricting access to payday loans, either directly or indirectly.5 Some 
states restrict access directly, by making such loans unavailable, such 
as through a ban. By the end of 2008, 10 states and the District of 
Columbia had instituted outright bans on payday lending. Other states 
have passed regulations that indirectly ban payday lending by making it 
unprofitable. For example, in Massachusetts, the Small Loan Act Caps 
interest at 23 percent per year. 
In states that allow payday lending, regulations may indirectly 
restrict or effectively ban the practice. A variety of such regulations   
exists. Most states legislate maximum loan amounts, usually from $300 
to $500. The limits that states impose on fees vary widely. In most 
states, the maximum fee allowable leaves the APR potentially well into 
three digits, limiting the effectiveness of restrictions on payday lending. 
Other states, however, severely limit fees, effectively banning payday 
lending. For example, in Arkansas, the maximum fee on a $100 two-
week loan is $0.65. Other states, such as Ohio and Oregon, have less- 
severe, but still restrictive, limits on fees. How effectively those states’ 
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Many common payday lending regulations are intended to protect 
consumers from both lenders and themselves—but they are unlikely 
to severely restrict access to payday loans. Among these regulations are 
minimum and maximum terms, maximum rollovers, rights of rescis-
sion, and limits on collateral requirements. A minority of states has leg-
islated a minimum term for payday loans. The minimum term is typi-
cally seven to 14 days. A number of states have legislated maximum 
terms, which are typically 31 days but range from 14 to 60 days. Few 
states currently limit rollovers, but over the last several years rollover 
limits have emerged as the most common new way to restrict payday 
lending, generally limiting rollovers to one. Rights of rescission, which 
give the borrower time to reconsider his loan, also are becoming more 
common. In most states, payday lenders cannot require collateral for 
the loans they make. Finally, nearly half of all states require payday 
lenders to offer payment plans to those unable to repay their loans. 
II.  HOW COULD PAYDAY LENDING RESTRICTIONS 
HARM CONSUMERS?
Much of the concern about payday loans centers on their high 
cost. Yet, restricting payday lending could deny consumer access to 
credit, limit their ability to maintain formal credit standing, or force 
them to seek more costly alternatives. This section explores the poten-
tial adverse effects on consumers of restricting payday lending. 
Potential costs of limiting access to payday lending
The most obvious and important cost of restricting payday lend-
ing would be the potential loss of credit access for consumers who may 
not have other sources of credit. Fully 50 percent of respondents to 
the 2007 payday loan customer survey responded that, when they   
secured their most recent payday loan, it was their only choice for 
short-term funds (Elliehausen). This assessment may have been inac-
curate in some cases, but lack of knowledge about credit alternatives 
has the same effect as a true lack of access.
Lack of access to credit can be costly to would-be borrowers. For 
example, without credit a broken-down car may not be repaired, at 
least for a while. Without transportation to work, the consumer could 
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to manage normal daily activities. Missed car payments that lead to re-
possession could have the same effects. A payday loan might also be the 
only reasonable option to provide for basic needs. For example, missed 
utilities payments can lead to disconnected services. At a less-essential 
level, a lack of access to credit may keep a small business owner from 
meeting unexpected expenditures or short-term revenue shortfalls. For 
example, failing to make a payment on time can result in loss of credit 
standing with an important supplier.
Without access to lenders, many financially constrained consumers 
may turn to family and friends. Payday lenders, however, report that 
many of their borrowers are reluctant to reveal their financial situation to 
others, or they have exhausted access to such loans (Caskey 2002). Oth-
ers may not have family or friends with the financial means to help them.
Restricting payday lending might also damage a would-be bor-
rower’s credit standing with traditional lenders. When faced with un-
anticipated changes in income or expenses, a borrower may be forced 
to miss loan payments or even default on a loan. Unlike traditional 
lenders, however, payday lenders typically do not report to credit agen-
cies. In the event that finances do not improve over the course of the 
loan period, defaulting on a payday loan would typically not harm the 
borrower’s formal credit standing. Thus, from this perspective, payday 
loans may be less risky than traditional loans.
In addition, a borrower could potentially stave off another credi-
tor with the proceeds of a payday loan. Most personal finance experts 
would strongly discourage such a practice, as much better options often 
exist, such as negotiating with the creditor. Still, when faced with a 
sudden expense or shortfall in income, a payday loan could protect the 
borrower’s credit standing. Moreover, a payday loan fee may be lower 
than a late payment fee. For example, the typical late payment fee on 
a credit card is $39 (Saha-Bubna). Recent changes to Federal Reserve 
Regulation Z limit late fees to $25, but that figure is still greater than 
the fees typically associated with small payday loans.
Another way payday lending can help a borrower protect his cred-
it standing is by reducing the number of outstanding loans reported to 
credit bureaus or trimming the degree to which other credit is tapped. 
For most consumers, the cost to credit standing of a more traditional 
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would. As explained below, the effective interest rates associated with cash 
advances or over-the-limit charges on credit cards can be as high as payday 
loan rates, potentially resulting in a negative mark on a credit report.
Finally, restricting payday lending might force borrowers to seek 
more costly credit alternatives. While a payday loan under normal cir-
cumstances is costly to the borrower, its terms could be more favorable 
than those of other sources of credit. Clearly, if access to a traditional 
lender such as a bank is available, most would-be payday borrowers 
would be better off seeking short-term funds there. But few banks make 
small-dollar loans. Even if they did, few typical payday loan borrowers 
would have sufficient credit standing to acquire such a loan. 
Credit cards are the traditional source for low-cost, short-term 
loans. But, according to the 2007 payday loan customer survey, almost 
half of payday loan borrowers do not have access to a credit card. Of 
those who have credit cards, 40 percent would exceed their credit limit 
with a charge the size of their most recent payday loan. About one-
third of respondents to the 2007 survey revealed that their credit card 
limit was sufficient to cover their most recent payday loan—but they 
still chose not to use their credit card (Elliehausen). Sometimes cash is 
needed, requiring a credit card cash advance, which is a less-attractive 
option than using a credit card to make a purchase. 
Lacking other options, a card-holding consumer facing a personal 
financial shock may decide to make an over-the-limit credit card pur-
chase or advance. The fees associated with charging more than the 
credit limit on a credit card are in many cases significantly higher than 
the fee on an equivalent payday loan.6 As of March 2010, the average 
over-the-limit fee was between $36 and $39. On a two-week, $100 
loan, typical of most payday loans, the effective rate of interest could 
exceed 1,000 percent. 
Several other alternatives to payday loans offer arguably less-favor-
able terms than payday loans. One such option is to bounce a check. 
Assuming that the borrower does not have overdraft protection through 
a savings account or line of credit, the bank on which the check is drawn 
may either return the check to the presenter or cover the check, leaving 
the account holder with a negative balance. In the latter case, the bank 
is, in essence, making a loan to the account holder, which typically re-
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(Bell). One study calculated the median interest rate on these loans to 
be well in excess of 4,000 percent, or up to 20 times that of payday 
loans (Fusaro). The highest rates result from bouncing multiple checks 
for small amounts, where a fee is charged for each bounced check. Fur-
ther, knowingly passing a fraudulent check is illegal and could result 
in substantial civil and criminal penalties. Finally, bounced checks can 
seriously impair the borrower’s credit standing, although they typically 
are not reported to credit bureaus. Of course, bouncing a check written 
to a payday lender, if deposited, would cause the borrower to pay both 
payday loan fees and bounced check charges.
Another nontraditional source of credit is pawnbroking, or the re-
lated concept of title lending. A 1991 estimate suggested that as much 
as 10 percent of the American population was served by pawnshops 
annually (Caskey 1991). A 2006 analysis of pawnbroking compiled a 
list of monthly interest rate ceilings for all 50 states and the District of 
Columbia (Shackman and Tenney). The median cap on interest rates 
was 15 percent monthly, which is similar to the typical payday loan 
charge. Many of the caps were much higher, however. 
A final avenue for short-term funds is a loan shark (Simon and 
White). Broadly, a loan shark lends small sums at an interest rate above 
the established legal rate. Over time, however, the term has come to 
have a more narrow meaning. Specifically, the term is usually associated 
with lending at exorbitant rates, with payment commonly enforced by 
threats of violence (West’s Encyclopedia of American Law). Loan sharking 
is often associated with organized crime. Because it is an underground 
activity, little research is available on loan sharking. Reportedly, inter-
est rates are commonly as high as 20 percent per week (American Bar 
Association). These rates, not to mention threats of violence to ensure 
payment, suggest that these loans would only be attractive to the most 
desperate borrowers with no other options. 
A report by the Center for Responsible Lending notes several alter-
natives to payday lending that arguably offer better terms than payday 
loans (2007). Among the alternatives are payment plans with credi-
tors, advances from employers, credit counseling, emergency assistance   
programs, credit union loans, cash advances on credit cards, military 
loans, and small consumer loans. In large part, these alternatives, if ac-
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A very relevant question, however, is whether payday borrowers have 
access to these alternatives. These options are appropriate for some pay-
day borrowers, although for some, access is quite limited. 
A look at Georgia data around the time of its payday lending 
ban provides some fairly strong evidence that bans on payday lend-
ing do not send borrowers to traditional lenders (Chart 1). Indeed, 
the opposite is observed. The growth in traditional lending fell off in 
Georgia relative to the nation following the ban. Specifically, by the 
fourth quarter of 2008, the average outstanding (traditional) debt in 
the nation had increased 36 percent, while increasing only 25 percent 
in Georgia. The divergence began around the time payday loans were 
banned in Georgia in 2004. If consumers shifted to traditional lending 
following the payday loan ban, one would expect growth in traditional 
lending to have at least kept pace with U.S. growth.
Restrictions to payday lending could also potentially harm   
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Chart 1
INDEBTEDNESS FOLLOWING GEORGIA’S PAYDAY 
LENDING BAN
Note: Each index takes a value of 100 on the third quarter of 2004, and preceding and succeeding num-
bers represent the value on that date compared to the third quarter of 2004, in percentage terms. Thus, 
by the fourth quarter of 2008, the average outstanding (traditional) debt in the United States as a whole 
had increased by 36 percent (from 100 to 136), while increasing by 24 percent in Georgia.  
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by many payday borrowers as a factor in their decision to seek a payday 
loan rather than some other, perhaps less costly, means of short-term 
financing. In the 2007 customer survey, about 28 percent of respon-
dents named “quick easy process,” “fast approval,” and “little paper 
work” as the most important reasons for choosing a payday loan over 
another source. A survey of the use of alternative service providers by 
low-income consumers in Georgia found that the immediacy of funds, 
the absence of credit checks, and convenience (both in terms of hours 
of operation and location) were typical reasons for using those services 
(Koonce-Lewis and others).
III. EVIDENCE
The previous section outlined a number of ways that payday lend-
ing restrictions could potentially harm consumers. This section reviews 
the existing evidence on the unintended consequences of payday lend-
ing restrictions. The section then provides new evidence derived from 
an examination of consumer credit data. 
Existing evidence on payday lender regulation and borrower outcomes
The early existing evidence, which predates payday lending,   
examined consumer impacts of restrictions on credit cards. Much of 
this evidence was reviewed in a study by Canner and Fergus, includ-
ing a study of four states that suggested imposing interest rate ceilings 
would substantially reduce the availability of bank credit card accounts 
(Dunkleberg and others). The evidence also suggested lower-income 
consumers would bear the greatest burden of these effects. Other studies 
have pointed to reduced access to credit under more heavily regulated 
consumer credit markets.
More-recent studies have focused on consumer outcomes of payday 
lending. One study similar to the analysis in this article found that after 
payday loans were banned in Georgia and North Carolina, households 
bounced more checks, complained more to the Federal Trade Commis-
sion about lenders and debt collectors, and filed for Chapter 7 bankrupt-
cy more often than households in states where payday lending was per-
mitted (Morgan and Strain). Specifically, they found that following the   
payday loan ban in Georgia, the returned check rate in the Federal Reserve’s 
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returned check rates declined at other check processing centers. Results 
for the Charlotte center following North Carolina’s payday loan ban told 
a similar story. Complaints against debt collectors increased 64 percent in 
Georgia and more than one-third in North Carolina. Again, these patterns 
were significantly different than those found in comparison states.
Using survey data in Oregon and Washington, another study found 
that the imposition of an interest rate cap in Oregon led to a sharp 
reduction in access to payday lending and that former payday borrow-
ers shifted into “incomplete and plausibly inferior substitutes,” such 
as bank overdrafts and late bill payments (Zinman). In another study, 
researchers conducted a laboratory experiment to gauge the degree to 
which access to payday loans would hinder or help consumers weath-
er personal expenditure shocks (Wilson and others). They found that 
payday loans helped subjects absorb expenditure shocks relative to a 
comparison group without access to payday loans (although those who 
demanded more than a threshold level of payday loans did worse than 
the comparison group).
The relationship between payday lending and social problems has 
been studied as well. A research team recently conducted a field experi-
ment in South Africa to gauge the consumer impact of credit extended 
at an annual rate of 200 percent (Karlan and Zinman). These loans, 
which were similar in structure to payday loans, were found to produce 
significant net benefits to borrowers along several dimensions. Among 
these were employment, income, and a measure of subjective well-be-
ing. For example, the share of people who reported leaving a job during 
the study period was 2.8 percentage points less for those involved in 
the experiment. Moreover, those who were given access to the loans 
borrowed more overall than the comparison group, suggesting that the 
loans loosened binding liquidity constraints. 
Another study related access to payday lending to community wel-
fare measures (specifically, foreclosure rates and small property crime) 
following natural disasters (Morse). For both of these measures, the 
presence of payday lenders in a community was associated with greater 
resilience (fewer “bad” outcomes) following a disaster. An earlier ver-
sion of the paper in 2007 showed that access to payday lenders in the 
face of natural disasters improved other welfare measures as well: births, 
deaths, and admissions to drug/alcohol treatment centers. Other re-76  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
search has found that legalized payday lending over a period of time has 
reduced rates of crime (Luea).
New evidence
New evidence on the effects of payday lending restrictions comes 
from analyzing two questions. First, do restrictions on payday lending 
harm a borrower’s formal credit standing?  Second, do such restrictions 
limit access to credit overall or compel consumers to use other nontradi-
tional credit sources less favorable than payday lending?  
The restrictions considered here are the most severe, as they either 
directly or effectively ban all payday lending in the state. Payday lend-
ing is considered accessible in counties without such state restrictions 
and inaccessible in counties with such restrictions. Data from consumer 
credit reports provided by the TransUnion credit bureau are used to 
examine these questions of credit standing and access.8 
The analysis is unique in the literature in two ways. First, it employs 
a dataset with a much larger and broader sample, incorporating data 
across all states, over time, aggregated from the individual consumer 
level. Second, the analysis uses a previously unemployed set of measures 
of consumer welfare, such as credit scores and loan delinquency rates. 
 Access to payday lending and credit standing. The first question ex-
plores the relationship between access to payday lending and formal 
credit standing. The premise is that, without access to payday lending, 
many borrowers who become mired in debt might be less able to man-
age their finances and make payments, which could easily result in a 
lower credit standing. The analysis uses two measures of formal credit 
standing to test this premise: credit scores and late bill payments. 
Credit scores provide the most direct measure of formal credit 
standing. Analyzing these data reveals that consumers in counties un-
der restrictive state payday lending laws were more likely to have low 
credit scores than consumers in counties where payday lending is legal. 
Low credit scores are defined here as those in the bottom 5 percent, 10 
percent, or 25 percent of credit scores nationally. These percentiles cor-
respond to scores below 421, 492, and 594, respectively.
Results from the analysis are provided in Table 1. The figures in 
Table 1 reflect differences in the share of consumers with low credit 
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by state laws and regulations, and in counties where payday lending is 
not accessible. In the first row, the figure -0.42 percent means that, after 
accounting for differences in income and unemployment, the share of 
consumers with credit scores in the bottom 5 percent nationally is 0.42 
percentage point lower in payday loan counties than in counties where 
payday lending is restricted. Thus, a lack of access to payday lending is 
associated with lower credit scores.
Often the debate over payday lending focuses on low-income con-
sumers because low-income consumers are most likely to borrow from 
payday lenders. Thus, a similar analysis was undertaken for low-income 
counties specifically, defined here as those with per capita income less 
than 50 percent of area median income.9 The results indicate that, af-
ter accounting for differences in income and unemployment, the share 
of consumers with the weakest credit scores was 0.36 percentage point 
lower in low-income payday loan counties than in low-income counties 
without legal access to payday lending. Again, evidence suggests that a 
lack of access to payday lending is associated with lower credit scores.
Similar analyses also were undertaken using the share of consumers 
with credit scores in the bottom 10 percentile group and the bottom 25 
percentile group. The shares of consumers in the 10th and 25th percen-
tile groups were 0.89 and 1.08 percentage points lower, respectively, in 
counties with access to payday lending than in counties where payday 
lending was restricted. 
Average credit standing also can be measured by the share of the 
population with late bill payments. The measure of late bill payments 
is 60 or more days past due on a credit account. The analysis first   
examined late bill payments across all categories of credit and then across 
more-narrow credit categories. The results reveal that consumers living 
in counties where payday lending is legally accessible were less likely to 
have late bill payments than consumers in counties under restrictive state 
payday lending laws and regulations (Table 1). 
The analysis reveals that the share of consumers in payday loan coun-
ties with late bill payments was 0.36 percentage point lower than the share 
of consumers with late bill payments in counties where payday lending 
was restricted. That is, about 4.9 percent of the population had late bill 
payments in any given quarter in counties where payday lending was ac-
cessible, compared to 5.3 percent in counties where payday lending was 78  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
not accessible. These results are consistent across narrow credit catego-
ries. Where payday lending was allowed, the share of borrowers with late 
(nonauto) installment loan payments was 0.31 percentage point lower 
in payday loan counties. The share of borrowers with late bank card pay-
ments was 0.08 percentage point lower in payday loan counties.10 
Although the magnitudes of these results may seem small, in per-
centage terms the results are quite significant. For example, on aver-
age, about 2 percent of consumers had overdue bank cards during the 
period of this analysis. Thus, a 0.08 percentage point difference means 
that the share of consumers with late bank card bills was 4 percent 
(0.08/2.0) lower in payday loan counties.
The results are similar when the analysis is restricted to low-income 
counties. For example, the share of consumers in low-income payday loan 
counties with past-due bill payments was 0.51 percentage point lower 
than in low-income counties where payday lending was severely restricted.
Table 1
ACCESS TO PAYDAY LENDING AND CREDIT STANDING
Difference in the share of consumers in counties 
with access to payday lending and without access to 
payday lending
Compiled Credit Report Item All Counties Low-Income Counties
Credit Score < 421  -0.42% -0.36%
(-19.4) (-10.5)
Credit Score <493  -0.89% -0.73%
(-18.9) (-10.1)
Credit Score <594  -1.08% -0.89%
(-20.5) (-11.6)
Any Credit Account 60+ Days Past Due -0.36% -0.43%
(-18.2) (-12.1)
Bank Card Account 60+ Days Past Due -0.08% -0.08%
(-9.71) (-8.96)
Installment Account 60+ Days Past Due -0.31% -0.51%
(-15.1) (-14.3)
Captive Auto Finance Account 60+ Days Past Due -0.01%  -0.02%
(-5.5) (-7.7)
Notes: T-statistics in parentheses.
All results are significant at the 5 percent level or better.
Information was unavailable on nonbank card revolving accounts past due.ECONOMIC REVIEW • FIRST QUARTER 2011  79
New evidence: Access to payday lending and alternative credit utilization
Payday lending restrictions may also limit access to credit overall or 
compel consumers to use other nontraditional credit sources less favorable 
than payday lending. This potential effect cannot be examined directly us-
ing credit bureau data because most nontraditional credit activities fail to 
show up on credit reports. For example, bounced checks generally do not 
appear on credit reports, unless the vendor employs a collection agency 
to recover the funds. Moreover, loans from pawnbrokers and loan sharks 
as well as cash advances and over-the-limit credit card purchases are not 
found on credit reports.
The effects of restrictions can be determined indirectly, however, 
using the credit bureau data. If traditional forms of credit, such as credit 
cards, consumer finance companies, and installment credit, are used 
more often with payday lending restrictions in place, credit reports will 
show a higher utilization rate. Conversely, if higher utilization is not 
observed where payday lending is restricted, would-be payday borrow-
ers either secured credit through another type of nontraditional lender 
(such as a pawn broker) or were unable to secure credit.11 In this case, 
restrictions on payday lending could harm consumers by restricting ac-
cess to credit.
One important measure of the use of traditional forms of credit 
is the number of accounts held by the consumer, which in most cases 
represents individual loans. The results do not show additional ac-
counts from traditional lenders in counties where payday lending is 
severely restricted, and therefore they are inconsistent with substitution 
between payday lending and more traditional forms of lending. That is, 
the results suggest that those living where payday lending is inaccessible 
because of restrictive laws and regulations typically tap other nontradi-
tional forms of credit in lieu of payday lenders or do not have access to 
credit at all.
The detailed results from the analysis of payday lending restrictions 
and number of credit accounts are provided in Table 2, Panel A. The 
interpretation of the results is similar to Table 1. Looking at all active 
credit accounts, consumers in counties with access to payday lending 
held 0.08 more traditional accounts than consumers in counties with 
no payday lending. The difference is small, meaning it is rather insig-
nificant economically. But if these more traditional forms of credit were 80  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
substitutes for payday lending, the number should have been negative 
and significantly larger. That is, those with access to payday lending 
should have used traditional forms of credit less often, which would 
have been partly reflected in fewer accounts. When only lower-income 
counties are considered, such differences are somewhat larger. On aver-
age, consumers in low-income counties with access to payday lending 
held 0.2 more accounts than consumers in low-income counties with-
out access to payday lenders.12  
The results are largely the same across types of accounts and are 
driven largely by the number of bank cards. The exception to the   
general finding is (non bank card) revolving accounts, where fewer tra-
ditional accounts were held by consumers with access to payday lending. 
Only one in eight consumers held revolving credit accounts, however.
Examining the number of new credit accounts consumers open 
during a quarter also shows that those without access to payday loans 
do not go to traditional borrowers. For all counties, an average of 0.2 
new credit accounts were obtained per consumer every quarter during 
the study period, or one new account for each five consumers. Con-
sumers with access to payday lending acquired 0.004 more new ac-
counts in a given quarter than did consumers without access to pay-
day lending. Consumers in low-income counties with access to payday 
lending acquired 0.01 more new accounts than those in low-income 
counties without access to payday lending. If payday lending were a 
substitute for more traditional credit accounts, fewer accounts should 
have been opened. Thus, the results suggest that consumers without 
access to payday lending do not acquire additional traditional credit ac-
counts as alternatives to payday loans. The results are consistent across 
all forms of credit, including revolving credit.
Another important measure of credit utilization is the amount of 
debt the consumer maintains. For this measure, the results are more 
consistent with substitution between payday lending and traditional 
forms of lending. That is, the results suggest that those without access 
to payday lending may use traditional forms of credit more often. Such 
a result runs counter to the notion that payday lending restrictions 
harm consumers by restricting access to credit.
Detailed results are provided in Table 2, Panel B. On average dur-
ing the study period, those with access to payday lending were in debt ECONOMIC REVIEW • FIRST QUARTER 2011  81
Table 2
ACCESS TO PAYDAY LENDING AND UTILIZATION OF 
TRADITIONAL CREDIT SOURCES
Difference in the share of consumers in counties 
with access to payday lending and without access 
to payday lending
Compiled Credit Report Item All Counties /a/ Low-Income Counties
Panel A
Active Accounts per Consumer  0.075 0.200
(5.2) (10.4)
New Accounts per Consumer  0.004 0.010
(8.9) (18.3)
Active Bank Card Accounts per Consumer /b/ 0.063 0.075
(22.1) (27.0)
Active Installment Accounts per Consumer  0.006 -0.006
(4.7) (-3.3)
New Installment Accounts per Consumer 0.009 0.010
(37.6) (24.5)
Active Revolving Accounts per Consumer -0.007 -0.001
(-27.3) (-4.3)
New Revolving Accounts per Consumer 0.005 0.004
(9.8) (5.0)
Panel B /c/
Total Debt per Consumer -$2,112 $354
(-16.0) (3.0)
Total Installment Debt per Consumer -$383 -$447
(-20.0) (-15.8)
Total Revolving Debt per Consumer -$4 -$14
(-5.1) (-11.8)
Notes:
/a/ T-statistics in parentheses; all results are significant at the five percent level or better.
/b/ The number of active installment accounts per customer.
/c/ Data were unavailable on total bank card debt per customer.
to traditional lenders by $2,112  less than those without access to pay-
day lending. Installment debt was $383 percent lower in payday loan 
counties. Revolving credit was a negligible $4 lower. These results are 
somewhat surprising given the experience following Georgia’s payday 
lending ban, where the growth in traditional debt leveled off relative to 
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In low-income counties, however, consumers with access to pay-
day lending had slightly more traditional debt than consumers without 
access. The lack of evidence for substitution between payday lending 
and traditional forms of credit in low-income counties is not surpris-
ing, given that many consumers in those communities have little or no 
access to traditional credit. These results suggests that in low-income 
counties, restrictions on payday lending may leave consumers without 
access to credit or access only to potentially more costly lenders.
Overall, the evidence on credit use is mixed.13 While some consum-
ers living in higher-income communities with payday lending restric-
tions may tap traditional credit more frequently, they do not acquire 
additional accounts to do so. The numbers do not reveal a great deal 
of substitution, as the difference for total debt is less than 6 percent. 
Moreover, in Georgia, there was no evidence that traditional lending 
increased following the state’s payday loan ban in 2004 (Chart 2). Fi-
nally, the option to substitute payday credit with traditional credit does 
not appear to exist in low-income communities, where many consum-
ers lack access to traditional credit. 
In addition to providing evidence suggesting that a ban on payday 
lending could harm consumers by reducing credit standing or limiting 
their access to credit, the analysis also considers other, less-restrictive 
regulations. Among these regulations are maximum loan amounts, 
maximum terms, and maximum rollovers. The results are consistent 
with the more-restrictive lending regulations. That is, there is no evi-
dence that traditional credit and payday loan credit are substitutes. In 
states with greater restrictions on payday lending, consumers do not 
use more traditional credit.
These results suggest an important follow up question: Why would 
consumers use payday loans if they had access to generally less costly tra-
ditional credit?  One reason suggested in Section II is that payday loans 
are more convenient. Another reason may be a need for cash specifically, 
rather than purchasing power more generally. Still others may be unin-
formed borrowers or misleading marketing by some payday lenders. 
A shortcoming of the analysis is the lack of information on the per-
vasiveness of payday lending within counties. While a ban or severe re-
strictions on payday lending imply a lack of access to such lending, the 
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counties in states without strict restrictions on payday lending may not 
have any payday lending establishments. In this case, access to payday 
lending is restricted even if the law allows it. Most counties, however, 
have at least one of the 20,000-plus payday lending establishments 
currently operating in the United States. The increasing availability of 
Internet-based payday lending may allow lenders to circumvent pay-
day loan restrictions in some states, which also could limit results. For-
tunately, in both cases, these limitations would likely lead the current 
analysis to underestimate the impact of payday lending restrictions on 
the credit profile of U.S. counties.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Policymakers in many states have restricted the practice of pay-
day lending. Critics of the practice claim that payday lenders take ad-
vantage of borrowers by charging exorbitant fees and targeting at-risk 
populations. They also claim that payday lending causes borrowers to 
fall into debt spirals, which create unmanageable cycles of debt. 
While these charges may be valid, restricting payday lending may 
also bring unintended consequences. It is important for policymakers 
to understand both the potential benefits of restricting payday lending 
as well as the potential costs. 
This article examined the practice of payday lending, why and 
how many states have restricted it, and how such restrictions might 
adversely affect some low-income and credit-constrained consumers. 
The results of its empirical analysis support the idea that restricting 
payday lending may indeed have costs. The evidence showed that con-
sumers in low-income counties may have limited access to credit in the 
absence of payday loan options. As a result, they may be forced to seek 
more costly sources of credit. The evidence also showed that, in coun-
ties without access to payday lending, consumers have a lower credit 
standing than consumers in counties with access.
The preponderance of evidence suggests that some consumers will 
likely face adverse effects if payday lending is restricted. Therefore, pol-
icymakers must carefully weigh the costs of payday lending restrictions 
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APPENDIX: 
DATA,  METHODOLOGY, AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The primary data employed in this analysis include consumer 
credit data at the county level for 2001-08 from the TransUnion credit 
bureau. Data on the history of payday loan legislation comes from the 
Consumer Credit Research Foundation and other sources. Other data 
employed are unemployment rates acquired from the U.S. Bureau of 
Labor Statistics and per capita personal incomes acquired from the 
U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis.
The methodology employed in the formal analysis is linear regres-
sion. Regression analysis involves estimating the parameters of a math-
ematical equation that models relationships among three or more vari-
ables. Here it is used to predict the effect of factors thought to explain 
average credit standing across counties, holding the values of other 
potential explanatory factors constant. As an example, the analysis esti-
mates the effect of access to payday lending on the average number of 
traditional credit accounts across counties. The form of the regression 
equations is:
 Number of Accounts per person = α + αt + β1 Payday Access (yes = 1, no 
= 0) +  β2  Per Capita Income + β3  Unemployment Rate + e.
The analysis estimates the values for the parameters in this equa-
tion, represented by the α’s and β’s. The key parameter in the analysis 
is β1, which in this sample case, shows the average difference in the 
average number of traditional credit accounts in counties where payday 
lending is allowed relative to counties where payday lending is not al-
lowed. Results are provided in the Appendix table.
The other variables included in the equation are designed to ac-
count for other factors likely affecting differences in credit profiles 
across counties. Following Morgan and Strain, these are per capita 
income and the unemployment rate. The parameter α is the average 
value of the dependent variable (in this example, number of accounts) 
over all counties across all years. The parameters αt measure fixed dif-
ferences in the number of accounts between years, estimated with a 
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of credit profiles across counties that are not observable and therefore 
not included in the analysis.
Endogeneity problems potentially exist with this exercise. A vari-
able is said to be endogenous if it is correlated with variables that are 
excluded from the model. For example, the behavior of consumers 
could have influenced regulation of payday lending, rather than the 
reverse. Some effort is made to address these issues in the discussion 
of the results, and in some cases, additional analyses were undertaken 
to evaluate any empirical problems. Nevertheless, limits on data avail-
ability prevent the estimation of an ideal model. This analysis is a par-
simonious exercise that should be considered as a first step in associat-
ing payday lending regulations with consumer credit outcomes. While 
some of the evidence supports the notion that restrictions on payday 
lending can harm consumers, more research needs to be done for a 
definitive answer to the question. Specifically, additional data, where 
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.ECONOMIC REVIEW • FIRST QUARTER 2011  89
ENDNOTES
1A 2000 Federal Reserve update of Regulation Z requires payday lenders to 
provide an APR to consumers (Federal Register).
2The Center does not cite the specific source for the quote or the company 
from which it came. 
3Some conflicting evidence exists but is limited. An analysis of data from 
Colorado revealed evidence consistent with competitive pricing in the early part 
of the 2000s (DeYoung and Phillips). But by the middle of the decade, “strategic 
pricing practices” and a tendency toward charging fees at the legislated price ceil-
ing were discovered. These practices are consistent with implicit collusion on the 
part of lenders toward these price points.
4Military personnel were formerly thought to be targets as well, as they were espe-
cially vulnerable to financial problems because of the military compensation system and 
their common geographic dislocation (Graves and Peterson). A provision in the Fiscal 
Year 2007 Military Authorization Act outlawed payday loans to military personnel.
5This subsection discusses the history of these regulations, based on research 
by the Consumer Credit Research Foundation. Various sources exist for research-
ing payday lending regulations across states. Unfortunately, definitions of seem-
ingly obvious terms, such as whether an outright ban of payday lending exists, 
vary across sources, and therefore so do the results of compiled information. The 
Consumer Credit Research Foundation’s history of the industry is a compendium 
supplemented by a variety of other sources. In cases where the sources differed on 
interpretation of the law, personal but knowledgeable judgment was used to arrive 
at a reasonable consensus view of the regulation.
6The Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009 
(CARD Act) outlaws over-the-limit fees unless the consumer opts in to have the 
flexibility to charge over the preset limit.
7The Federal Reserve imposed new rules in November 2009 that require 
customers to opt in to “overdraft protection.” As of November 2010, about 75 
percent of consumers had opted in for overdraft protection (Benoit). Effective 
July 1, 2011, a new rule issued by the FDIC on November 23, 2010 limiting 
daily fees for overdrafts takes effect (Washington Post).
8The data provided by TransUnion Trend data, are county-level aggregates 
derived from depersonalized credit records.
9Area median income is defined as metropolitan median income for counties 
within metropolitan areas and state median income for rural counties. 
10There was little difference in the share of consumers with late auto pay-
ments across counties.
11A limitation of this analytical approach is that it cannot identify borrow-
ers seeking other ways of addressing financial shortfalls, such as negotiating with 
creditors or borrowing from family or friends. These exceptions are not expected 90  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
to be substantial, however. In the 2007 payday loan customer survey, 51 percent 
of payday borrowers stated that a payday loan was their “only choice,” suggest-
ing that these traditional options were not available to them. Further, a smaller 
percentage of survey respondents said they considered borrowing from a friend 
or relative (23 percent) than stated they could have borrowed from a friend or 
relative (28 percent). This observation suggests that much of the payday loan 
customer base would not seek a loan from a friend or relative even if that friend 
or relative had the capacity and willingness to make the loan.
12One might argue that payday borrowers have a greater proclivity for bor-
rowing overall, and that this may somehow temper the results. However, this 
evaluation compares consumers where payday lending was accessible to consum-
ers where it was not. It does not compare payday borrowers as individuals with 
consumers who were not payday loan customers. Thus, the proclivity for pay-
day customers to borrow generally, whether greater than other consumers or not, 
should not matter for these results. On the contrary, to the extent that public 
policies reflect the will of the citizenry, one might expect that states with a large 
number of borrowers would be less likely to eliminate access to payday lending.
13A possibility for the mixed results is that average total debt, or some other 
general measure of traditional credit utilization, influences the decision to restrict 
payday lending rather than the reverse, as estimated here. That is, payday lending 
could be more commonly allowed in places where consumers borrow more. An 
estimate of such a model (results available from the author), however, reveals the 
reverse. Payday lending tends to be restricted where total debt is higher. More 
conceptually, there is no reason to suspect that consumers in some counties bor-
row significantly more than others, once account is taken of differences in income 
and unemployment, as was done in this analysis. Indeed, an assessment of the 
data in this analysis bears that out. Once account of was taken of income and un-
employment, 99 percent of counties’ borrowing levels were within one standard 
deviation of the mean level of borrowing.ECONOMIC REVIEW • FIRST QUARTER 2011  91
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